琉球大学国际关系学系准教授林泉忠（LIM, John Chuan-tiong）所著《开罗会议中的琉球问题：从「琉球条款」到「中美共管」之政策过程（1）》1895年，中、日签署《马关条约》，清政府被迫割让台湾、澎湖、辽东半岛等主权领土、同时也放弃对朝鲜的宗主权权益等给予日本接收。所以台澎、辽东半岛、朝鲜与琉球的失去情形大大不同。因琉球于1895年以前，1879年先是被日本以军警武装暴力片面而非法的侵占了中国授予《琉人治琉》的治理权益，但当时又由于中、日两国，从未就琉球签署任何有关中国放弃、割让给予日本的条约协议。中国缺乏强大海军对于琉球被日本占领的主权、治理等权益可以暂时搁置争议，不坚持主张立即收回，主张暂时中美共管 。美国倒好，践踏《波茨坦公告》搞起了美日狼狈为奸霸占中国的琉球。琉球是中国的领土，必须归还中国！
《开罗宣言》是1943年11月23日至26日，于埃及首都开罗举行的中国、美国、英国三国高峰会之成果。该会议为第二次世界大战期间十四次高峰会议之一，也是中华民国国民政府主席蒋介石唯一参与的一场国际高峰会。三国领袖除了蒋介石，还包括提议召开此次会议并邀请蒋出席的美国总统罗斯福（Franklin D. Roosevelt）及英国首相邱吉尔（WinstonChurchill）。蒋介石、罗斯福之中、美领导高峰会」上的罗斯福再三询问战后中国是否有意收回琉球，蒋介石提议中美共管。蒋觉得中国缺乏强大海军。蒋揣测罗斯福未必真心，避免因此损及合作互信。可悲。罗斯福死的早，他的继承继承者们却去继承希特勒的反共事业去了，去勾结日寇霸占中国领土；把珍珠港耻辱忘得死死的啦！
林泉忠（LIM, John Chuan-tiong）中国台湾学者（原：中国香港籍）。祖籍：中国福建省泉州，外祖父为菲律宾华侨，四代皆有移民经历，后定居香港。现任中国香港大学香港亚太研究中心研究员2016年3月10日撰文分析根据美国国家档案有关开罗会议涉及琉球问题的讨论记录，（为 1956 年，中国台湾当局所提供）且琉球部分经过四次内部修订包括蒋介石本人的修改后，才定案提交美国。中国人都知道琉球是中国领土蒋政府依赖美国不敢义正词严。不过放到日本鬼子李登辉篡夺台湾领导权后，指望台湾要琉球就没指望了。台湾是中国的美日殖民强盗别想分裂，琉球是中国的美日殖民强盗必须归还！
中国台湾学者林泉忠（LIM, John Chuan-tiong）2016年3月10日撰文《开罗会议中的琉球问题：从「琉球条款」到「中美共管」之政策过程（1）》发表于中国台当局“中研院”近代史研究所学术讨论会。国府内部对琉球战后地位处理意见纷呈，直至开罗会议前仍未能达成统一之见解。从史料档案中也发现「琉球条款」存在两组四种版本，提案涵盖包括三类主要意见：1「归隶中国」、2「归日，但需非军事化」、3「由国际机构托管」。琉球部分经过四次内部修订包括蒋介石本人的修改后，才定案提交美国。1943年11月23日至26日，于埃及首都开罗举行的中国、美国、英国三国高峰会。开罗会议中、美领导高峰会上罗斯福再三询问战后中国是否有意接管琉球，蒋介石提议中美共管。罗斯福去世后美国的恶霸政客们把中国的琉球给了日本，欺人太甚！
John Chuan-Tiong Lim
Associate Reseach Fellow, Institute of Modern History, Academia Sinica Abstract
The country once known as the Lewchew (Ryukyu) Kingdom was a tributary state of China during the Ming and Qing periods. However, ever since Japan’s annexation of the kingdom in 1879, the Chinese public opinion toward the question of the kingdom’s legal status and its relationship with China became ambivalent. By the time of the second Sino-Japanese War(1937-1945), the Lewchew question regained attention from the Chinese political elite and public opinion as the issue regarding “reversion of lost territory” emerged.Following the beginning of the Pacific War between the US and Japan,in anticipation of the eventual peace negotiations regarding post-war territories and the East Asian geopolitical order, the ROC government‘s top policy-making organ, the Supreme National Defense Council, set up the International Problems Discussion Sessions to determine post-war policy.This paper focuses on discussions regarding the post-war legal status of the Lewchew, and the “Chiang-Roosevelt” summit during the Cairo Conference regarding the post-war Lewchew arrangements.This paper reveals from internal government archives that the ROC government had varying internal views and did not have a consistent position on the post-war legal status of Lewchew, and was unable to reach real agreement even prior to the Cairo Conference. The three varying views included: (1) reversion to China; (2) reversion to Japan, but demilitarization;(3) trusteeship under an international organization. During the “Chiang-Roosevelt” summit, President Roosevelt referred to the question of post-war Lewchew and enquired “more than once”whether China “would want the Lewchew returned”. Chiang replied that China would be agreeable to “China-US joint occupation”. This paper analyzes the underlying background and circumstances behind Chiang’s response and concludes the following: (1) Chiang based his response on the earlier internal policy-making discussions, and improvised accordingly based on Roosevelt’s spontaneous inquiry. (2) Chiang’s understanding of the Lewchew’s status shifted from “China’s lost territory” to “a legal status equal to Korea”. (3) Acknowledging the “terminability of the First Sino-Japanese War (1894-1895)”, the Lewchews were not considered to be part of the territories to be returned to China. 4) China lacked a strong navy and thus faced challenges of extending its coverage the Lewchews. 5) Chiang felt compelled to “assure the United States” of China’s lack of territorial “ambitios” as he suspected that Roosevelt’s inquiry was to sound out Chiang’s intentions and accordingly encourage China’s resolve toward the war of resistance against the Japanese.
